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Abstract—Smart Grids are amongst the most promising future 
developments to manage and control the energy consumption in 
the next decades. However, the integration and 
interdependencies that will evolve between the electricity power 
grid, telecommunication networks and ICT enable new threats 
and vulnerabilities to this critical infrastructure which must be 
addressed adequately with the right kind of security controls, 
balanced risk mitigation strategies and a continuous attention 
towards security, privacy and regulation aspects. It is an 
emerging area where new data privacy problems arise as mass 
rollout of smart meters is already happening. 
 
Index Terms—Smart Grid, Data Privacy, Smart Meter, 
Privacy by Design. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
HE appearance of Smart Grids with intelligent meters 
alters the polling frequency of measurement and the 
coverage of the measurement at the consumer location. 
Namely up to now the measuring frequency is low and covers 
an area or larger number of energy users, the intelligent meter 
may change the frequency to minutes or real-time whereas the 
coverage is in the range of individual consumers or 
households. This implies that where up to now the operator 
has a large view of the energy behavior of a bigger set of 
consumers, this view will evolve to detailed information on 
the energy behavior of sole end consumers and most data from 
Smart Grids can be considered personal data [1]-[5]. 
Smart Grid applications are based on the advances the 
Electric Power System and increased integration with 
communications and information technology together with 
sensors and actuators for active monitoring and control. The 
potential benefits of the Smart Grids are far-reaching and 
significant like the opportunities for consumers to cut their 
bills by changing their habits, perhaps using energy at 
different times to take advantage of lower tariffs, as well as 
opportunities for industry to more accurately forecast demand, 
reducing expensive electricity storage costs and the realization
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of climate change targets. However they also have the 
potential to process increasing amounts of personal data, 
unprecedented in this industry, and to make that personal data 
more readily available to a wider circle of recipients than at 
present. 
The implementation of Smart Grids potentially connects 
location information to specific data that holds information on 
the use of electrical energy, and in the future possibly more. 
The fingerprint or contents of this data provides information 
on what is going on at the location at a specific moment, and 
may show patterns over longer time which may have great 
impact on the privacy and security of the consumer [14].  
Thus it is necessary to deploy adequate measures to protect 
the contents and nature of this data in order to safeguard the 
privacy of the consumer. Without such protection there is a 
risk not only that processing of personal data will be in breach 
of national laws but also that consumers will reject these 
programmes on the basis that the collection of personal data is 
unacceptable to them. Such rejection may arise even if there is 
no breach of the law. Therefore it is necessary that all parties 
involved in the deployment of smart meters and the 
development of the smart grid ensure that the fundamental 
rights of individuals are protected and respected. 
 These concerns are also reflected in Strategic Research 
Agenda for the year 2035 of the European Technology 
Platform on Smart Grids [15]. That is an update of the 
Strategic Research Agenda 2007 for the needs by the year 
2035. Namely regarding changes between 2007 and 2011 with 
sensitivity towards better predicting today the needs for the 
year 2035, it is obvious that Data and Information is becoming 
much more important. The amount of data that is available but 
also to be handled has increased very much since 2007 and 
continues to increase exponentially. One reason is the already 
wide penetration of smart meters which will increase 
dramatically within next years. This allows new business 
models but also increases the need for data security. Here, 
consumers became much more aware of this topic and became 
very concerned about the privacy of their data. The increased 
amount of data also increased the need to use the grid for data 
transport. 
II.  BACKGROUND 
Privacy is normally assumed as the ability of an individual 
to be left alone, out of public view, free from surveillance or 
interference from others (individuals, organizations or the 
state) and in control of information about himself. Privacy is 
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not a plainly delineated concept and is not simply the 
specifications provided within laws and regulations. 
Furthermore, privacy should not be confused, as it often is, 
with being the same as confidentiality; and personal 
information is not the same as confidential information. 
Confidential information is information for which access 
should be limited to only those with a business need to know 
and that could result in compromise to a system, data, 
application, or other business function if inappropriately 
shared. 
Privacy was not of particular concern for many decades in 
the electricity networks which have provided the vital links 
between electricity producers and consumers with great 
success. The basic architecture of these networks was 
developed in most countries to meet the needs of large, 
predominantly carbon-based generation technologies. Since 
Europe is committed to the 20-20-20 targets to reduce carbon 
emissions and to secure energy supply, energy efficiency and 
renewable energy are seen as solution to attain this goal. Both 
measures call for changes in the energy supply system leading 
to smart grids as key enablers for the required innovation. 
The Smart grid is usually defined as an intelligent 
electricity network that combines information from users of 
that grid in order to plan the supply of electricity more 
effectively and economically that was possible in the pre-
smart environment. It is a challenge to efficiently integrate the 
behavior and actions of all users connected to it – generators, 
consumers and those that do both – in order to ensure 
economically efficient, sustainable power system with low 
losses and high levels of quality and security of supply and 
safety. A further step will be energy optimization crossing the 
domains of electricity, gas and heat.  
 
 
Fig 1.  A conceptual model of the Smart Grid. 
 
Key factors comprise the degree of decentralization of the   
system components and their interrelation with electricity 
networks, the variability of renewable generation, the 
increased distance between electricity generation and 
consumption, the intelligence level of the involved systems 
created by smart products and associated smart services, the 
legal framework, the associated regulation of market based 
product and service choices versus natural monopoly products 
and services and the business roles for actors involved in all 
aspects of networks and intelligent electric systems.  
Furthermore the integration requires fast data transfer 
architectures between grid control areas and between 
distribution and transmission system operators’ systems: a 
huge amount of data has to be exchanged as much as possible 
in real time and with a high reliability between areas in order 
to promptly react to any change in the grid operation 
parameters. To exploit economies of scale and to provide 
scalable solutions, the deployed field devices and systems 
have to be as much as possible interoperable and standardized. 
The introduction of smart meters makes the process more 
complex in that the data subject will provide suppliers with 
insights into personal routines. There is a big difference in 
circumstances between countries, ranging from those where 
rollout is largely complete following government mandate to 
those where no meters have been installed. Furthermore high 
volumes of data coming from smart monitoring devices and 
smart meters must be managed efficiently. Such growth in 
data flow needs to be organized and structured to be relevant 
information ready for distribution and communication. 
The new approach in energy systems should be based on 
role based data access. Namely, data must be owned by and 
located at the data “originator” from where will be utilized for 
all relevant purpose - but with restricted access to what is 
relevant for the owner of the data. This calls for enhanced 
activities for ensuring high level of cyber security and respect 
of the privacy issue. One important step in this process is data 
minimization in respect of purpose and time limitation and 
data quality. Namely data should be collected for specific, 
explicitly defined and legitimate purposes and not further 
processed in a way incompatible with those purposes. Data 
quality supposes that they are adequate, relevant and not 
excessive in relation to the purposes for which they are 
collected and/or further processed as well as accurate and, 
where necessary, kept up to date. Furthermore data needs to 
be retained only for as long as is necessary to fulfill that 
purpose. 
III. STAKEHOLDERS 
Smart Grids include a much wider area than smart metering 
which is an important first step towards a Smart Grid. Smart 
meters bring intelligence to the ‘last mile’ between the grid 
and the final customer. Without this key element, the full 
potential of a Smart Grid may not be realized. Being that only 
few countries in Europe have undertaken a full deployment of 
smart meters actors involved in the sector should draw from 
existing experiences and take account of best practices in 
place. 
The smart metering brings with it the potential for 
numerous novel ways for processing data and delivering 
services to consumers. Whatever the processing, whether it is 
similar to that which existed in the pre-smart environment, or 
unprecedented, the data controller must be clearly identified, 
and be clear about obligations arising from data protection 
legislation including Privacy by Design, security and the 
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rights of the data subject. Data subjects must be properly 
informed about how their data is being processed, and be 
aware of the fundamental differences in the way that their data 
is being processed so that when they give their consent it is 
valid. 
Therefore the following Smart Grid stakeholders are: 
• Grid users including/composed of grid operators, grid 
customers and meter operators 
• End customer (domestic or commercial) 
• Municipalities including energy retailers 
• Politics 
• Industries 
• Consumer organizations 
• Politics/society. 
It can also be viewed through various domains 
interconnected by secure communication flows and flows of 
electricity as presented in Fig. 2. 
 
 
Fig. 2.  Interaction among actors in Smart Grid. 
 
Data processing service providers in provision of data 
processing services are in charge of respecting consumer 
privacy. Basically the smart meter takes a reading which 
reflects the energy usage at the property. At some point that 
reading, along with other information, can be transmitted 
outside the property. In some models it will be sent directly to 
a central communications hub where the smart meter data are 
managed. Once there, it can be accessed by DSOs, suppliers 
and ESCOs. It appears that the DSOs will have to face the 
greatest changes to make smart grids a reality. That is because 
of the growing distributed character (resulting in growing 
bidirectional power flow at all voltage levels) and variability 
of generation, customer privacy issues, system security, data 
and information processing for new applications and concepts 
such as Virtual Power Plants, etc. 
Also multiple and complex methods of communication, 
with additional entry points and data paths creating 
complicated security challenges requiring solutions that 
encompass them all should be taken onto consideration. Given 
the complex and disparate landscape, the task of producing 
privacy solutions is quite challenging, and at this stage it 
seems that they can only be general, rather than specific. 
The disparity of the current position does not allow 
presenting a comprehensive view on all specific aspects of 
smart metering programs across the countries. There is a huge 
variation in circumstances between countries, ranging from 
those where rollout is largely complete following government 
mandate to those where no meters have been installed. There 
is also much variation in the level of involvement from DPAs 
and in the nature of the market across member states, and 
where responsibility lies with installation of meters. In some 
countries, publicly owned utility companies are responsible. 
Elsewhere, there is a competitive supplier market. Distribution 
system operators have a more prominent role in some 
countries.  
The smart grid brings a completely new and complex model 
of inter-relationships that poses challenges for the application 
of data protection. In this emerging area it is fully expected 
that new data protection problems and solutions will evolve as 
more smart meters and smart grid components are installed. It 
is obvious is that mass deployment of smart meters is already 
happening, so there is urgency to comprehend the way that 
smart meters process personal data, and the issues that this 
raises. The issues of general concern warrant serious 
consideration by all those involved in this area. Since data in 
Smart Grids might contain privacy sensitive information the 
principles such as privacy by design and default should be 
involved. The personal data is being processed by the meters, 
so data protection laws apply. 
Data controller must be clearly identified, and be clear 
about obligations arising from data protection legislation, 
security and the rights of the data subject whatever the 
processing, whether it is similar to that which existed in the 
pre-smart environment. Data subjects must be properly 
informed about how their data is being processed, and be 
aware of the fundamental differences in the way that their data 
is being processed so that when they give their consent it is 
valid. 
IV. PRIVACY THREATS 
The privacy implications are numerous for smart grid 
technology deployment centers on the collection, retention, 
sharing, or reuse of electricity consumption information on 
individuals, homes, or offices. Basically, smart grid systems 
will be multidirectional communications and energy transfer 
networks that enable electricity service providers, consumers, 
or third party energy management assistance programs to 
access consumption data. In addition, if plans for national or 
transnational electric utility smart grid systems proceed as 
currently proposed these far reaching networks will enable 
data collection and sharing across platforms and great 
distances [7]-[11]. 
As consumer privacy is a key factor in the change towards 
smart energy systems thus data access and ownership and the 
permission to gather data need to be very carefully considered. 
At the same time, consumers should be well informed about 
who deals with their data. It has to be emphasized that it is the 
consumer who owns his data, no one else, and therefore he is 
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entitled to appropriate rights and protections. 
 
Fig. 3.  Consumer profiling by energy. 
 
A list of potential privacy concerns in Smart Grid systems 
include: 
• Activity Censorship 
• Decisions and Actions Based Upon Inaccurate Data 
Profiling • Identity Theft 
• Unwanted Publicity and Embarrassment • Determine Personal Behavior Patterns 
• Tracking Behavior of Renters/Leasers • Determine Specific Appliances Used 
• Behavior Tracking (possible combination with Personal 
Behavior Patterns) 
• Perform Real-Time Surveillance 
• Reveal Activities Through Residual Data 
• Public Aggregated Searches Revealing Individual 
Behavior. 
• Targeted Home Invasions (latch key children, elderly, 
etc.) 
• Provide Accidental Invasions 
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Fig. 4.  Logical separation of metering and energy management. 
 
Additionally, plans are underway to support smart grid 
system applications that will monitor any device transmitting a 
signal, which may include non-energy-consuming end use 
items that are only fitted with small radio frequency 
identification devices (RFID) tags may be possible. Whereas, 
in Europe energy theft and privacy are the most important 
concerns related to Smart Grid implementation, in other parts 
of the world (e.g. in the US) it is energy theft and malevolent 
attacks that are the main concerns. 
V. PRIVACY PRINCIPLES 
The increased amount of personal data being processed, the 
possibility of remote management of connection and the 
likelihood of energy profiling based on the detailed meter 
readings make it imperative that proper consideration is given 
to individuals’ fundamental rights to privacy. The reference 
architecture for the home/building, pointing out the different 
logical blocks, and can be easily integrated in the whole 
system architecture is shown in Fig. 4. It is not related to a 
specific hardware design, but merely shows a logical 
separation of functions without predefining where and how 
those functions are implemented.  
Privacy by Design (PbD) is a concept to address the ever-
growing and systemic effects of Information and 
Communication Technologies, and of large-scale networked 
data systems [12]. The objectives of Privacy by Design — 
ensuring privacy and gaining personal control over one’s 
information and, for organizations, gaining a sustainable 
competitive advantage — may be accomplished by practicing 
the following seven Foundational Principles: 
1. Proactive not Reactive; Preventative not Remedial 
measures by anticipating and preventing privacy 
invasive events before they happen. PbD does not wait 
for privacy risks to materialize, nor does it offer 
remedies for resolving privacy infractions once they 
have occurred — it aims to prevent them from 
occurring. In short, Privacy by Design   comes before 
the-fact, not after. 
2. Privacy as the Default Setting i.e. ensuring that 
personal data are automatically protected in any given 
IT system or business practice. If an individual does 
nothing, their privacy still remains intact. No action is 
required on the part of the individual to protect their 
privacy — it is built into the system, by default. 
3. Privacy Embedded into design and architecture of IT 
systems and business practices. It is not bolted on as an 
add-on, after the fact. The result is that privacy 
becomes an essential component of the core 
functionality being delivered. Privacy is integral to the 
system, without diminishing functionality. 
4. Full Functionality — Positive-Sum, not Zero-Sum, by 
accommodating all legitimate interests and objectives 
in a positive-sum “win-win” manner, not through a 
dated, zero-sum approach, where unnecessary tradeoffs 
are made such as privacy vs. security, demonstrating 
that it is possible to have both. 
5. End-to-End Security — Full Lifecycle Protection 
extending securely throughout the entire lifecycle of the 
data involved — strong security measures are essential 
to privacy, from start to finish. This ensures that all data 
are securely retained, and then securely destroyed at the 
end of the process, in a timely fashion. 
6. Visibility and Transparency — thus its component parts 
and operations remain visible and transparent, to users 
and providers alike. Remember, trust but verify. 
7. Respect for User Privacy — Keeping it User-Centric 
appropriate notice, and empowering user-friendly 
options. 
Yet, privacy concerns still need to be transposed into 
specific, precise and non-ambiguous technical requirements if 
they are to allow the security industry to competitively design 
and develop privacy-compliant solutions and services. The 
Privacy by Design concept should, at its turn, be better 
detailed in order to allow for its practical implementation in 
concrete cases. 
There are also OECD Privacy Guidelines: 
1. Collection Limitation Principle: There should be limits 
to the collection of personal data and any such data 
should be obtained by lawful and fair means and, where 
appropriate, with the knowledge or consent of the data 
subject. 
2. Data Quality Principle: Personal data should be 
relevant to the purposes for which they are to be used 
and, to the extent necessary for those purposes, should 
be accurate, compete and kept up-to-date. 
3. Purpose Specification Principle: The purposes for 
which personal data are collected should be specified 
not later than at the time of collection and the 
subsequent use limited to the fulfillment of those 
purposes or such others as are not incompatible with 
those purposes and as are specified on each occasion of 
change of purpose. 
4. Use Limitation Principle: Personal data should not be 
disclosed, made available or otherwise used for 
purposes other than those specified in accordance with 
Principle 3 except — with the consent of the data 
subject; or by the authority of law. 
5. Security Safeguards Principle: Personal data should be 
protected by reasonable security safeguards against 
such risks as loss or unauthorized access, destruction, 
use, modification or disclosure of data. 
6. Openness Principle: There should be a general policy 
of openness about developments, practices and policies 
with respect to personal data. Means should be readily 
available of establishing the existence and nature of 
personal data, and the main purposes of their use, as 
well as the identity and usual residence of the data 
controller. 
7. Individual Participation Principle: An individual should 
have the right: a. To obtain from the data controller, or 
otherwise, confirmation of whether or not the data 
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controller has data relating to him; b. To have 
communicated to him, data relating to him. 
8. Accountability Principle: A data controller should be 
accountable for complying with measures that give 
effect to the principles stated above. Data can be sent to 
the controller in real-time or be stored in the smart 
meter. In both cases however, under the Data 
Protection Directive, it is considered that the data have 
been collected by the controller.  
As part of the Privacy by Design process, security and 
privacy risk assessments will identify the potential risks to 
data security. Given the novel and vast prospect that is in store 
with the smart grid and its associated technologies, the task of 
anticipating security requirements is a challenging one. In 
order to mitigate risk, the approach should be end-to-end, 
incorporating all parties and drawing on a broad range of 
expertise. Security should also be designed in at the early 
stage as part of the architecture of the network rather than 
added on later. Appropriately robust security safeguards must 
be in place that should apply to the whole process including 
the in-home elements of the network, the transmission of 
personal data across the network and the storage and 
processing of personal data by suppliers, networks and other 
data controllers. Security is a path, not a destination. Security 
is about risk management and implementing effective counter 
measures.  
The technical and organizational safeguards should cover at 
least the following areas: 
• The prevention of unauthorized disclosures of personal 
data; 
• The maintenance of data integrity to ensure against 
unauthorized modification; 
• The effective authentication of the identity of any 
recipient of personal data; 
• The avoidance of important services being disrupted 
due to attacks on the security of personal data; 
• The facility to conduct proper audits of personal data 
stored on or transmitted from a meter; 
• Appropriate access controls and retention periods; 
• The aggregation of data whenever individual level data 
is not required. 
One of the aspects which can cause public trust to diminish 
is the retention of data. Namely data retention for the purposes 
of smart metering needs an in depth analysis. since smart 
metering, by collecting and processing data on all electricity 
flows within the grid, is capable of contributing to ubiquitous 
surveillance of the energy consumers by collection of facts 
and details arising from consumption of electricity i.e. 
profiling. Depending on the actual technical design of a 
particular electricity grid, smart metering can have a profound 
negative impact on privacy. A suggestion that privacy is 
jeopardized may cause public trust to diminish unless proper 
transparent strategies are in place to convince the people.  
Data retention covers storing data (personal or any other 
type) for meeting various legal and business data archival 
requirements, as well as backup and historical purposes. 
There are several reasons for the retention of personal and 
technical data within smart metering. Depending on future 
developments and desired functionality there can be even 
more of them. 
 
1. Network Maintenance. The utilities need some data, both 
personal and technical in nature, that is required for standard 
network operation. For this kind of data, in many cases there 
is little reason for long term retention – if it had not been used 
within a week, the data usually provides little benefit. For 
some long term maintenance functions, utilities need to store 
information for a longer period of time. In this case, the 
information could be aggregated, either over several users as 
to be large enough to ensure privacy, or by deriving very 
coarse grained information about a single customer (e.g. 
assigning one of ten customer profiles). Some cases (e.g. local 
legislation) may warrant the retention of more detailed data 
for a specific purpose. Some operators will need detailed data 
and some might be satisfied on aggregated or anonymised 
data. Hence, special attention must be paid to those operators 
who process personal data (i.e. non-aggregated and not 
anonymised). 
 
2. Billing and payments. Certain data must be retained in 
order to compute the electricity bill. An estimate on the 
retention time is around a year, but depends on payment 
intervals. There is a difference among the countries between 
the current practices on frequency when the customer is billed. 
 
3. Taxation. Utilities need to maintain some financial data (i.e. 
on their income) for tax purposes for a specified time (tax 
records). It seems that tax record can sufficiently rely only on 
the top-line figures (e.g. the final sum of bills/invoices). This 
would not include detailed data on electricity consumption 
(e.g. the 15-min interval meter readings.).  
 
4. Added Value Services. These are additional services, apart 
from energy supply, provided by the utility and/or third parties 
on a commercial basis. These are of high business-related 
importance for distributors and suppliers. They are capable of 
providing more benefits for all Smart Grids actors (e.g. energy 
savings), but also of too big an intrusion to private live. At 
present, we do not know much exact examples of such 
services. Yet nobody can predict what market value for third 
parties can have the detailed data on energy consumption. 
Two simple examples can be given as the optimisation of 
energy consumption (e.g. ‘join the savings programme’) and 
goods or services offered thy third parties: (e.g. ‘since it is 
known that you do not use much electricity after 8 pm, go to 
the cinema half price’). 
 
5. Law enforcement. There are a number of points of interest 
for law enforcement (e.g. police, intelligence, tax and customs 
authorities) in smart metering’s data retention. Here we are 
touching criminal law and thus the rules on due process (fair 
trial) and presumption of innocence must be observed. 
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6. Policy-Making. The state itself (as a regulator) might be 
interested in data retention for the policy-making purposes. It 
is a matter of energy security and production planning, among 
others.  
 
7. Profiling, red-lining and discrimination. The detailed data 
on electricity consumption might interest various commercial 
actors outside the electricity market, among others. The 
retained data are vital for making a customer’s profile, as the 
creation of a profile highly depends on retained personal data. 
The ‘profiling’ means ‘an automatic data processing technique 
that consists of applying a ‘profile’ to an individual, 
particularly in order to take decisions concerning her or him or 
for analyzing or predicting her or his personal preferences, 
behaviors and attitudes.’ A ‘profile’ is ‘a set of data 
characterizing a category of individuals that is intended to be 
applied to an individual. Such profiling might lead to denial of 
services or increase their cost should a profile proves to be 
somehow dangerous or risky (‘red-lining’). Furthermore, even 
a simple and non-detailed profile of energy consumption 
might facilitate commission of certain types of crimes.  
VI. TECHNICAL SOLUTIONS 
Final report of the CEN/CENELEC/ETSI Joint Working 
Group on Standards for Smart Grids [5] presents WAN 
interface to AMI subsystem & Head-End is used to connect 
the meter, a Local Network Access Point, or a Neighbourhood 
Network Access Point to a Central Data Collection system. 
Typical interface platforms for these interfaces are PSTN 
networks, public G2 (GPRS) and G3 (UMTS) networks, DSL 
or broadband TV communication lines, power line 
communications (PLC), either in narrowband or broadband. 
The Head-End systems are the central Data Collection 
Systems for the Advanced Metering Subsystem. Head-end 
systems are typically part of an AMR (automatic meter 
reading) or AMM (automatic meter management) solution. 
The interface towards the gateways and data concentrators 
(Network Access Points) is being standardized with 
Mandate M/441 whilst the interface from head-end systems 
towards central ERP and meter data management systems is 
covered by other IEC TCs, e.g. IEC TC 57 (61968-9).  
Little work exists on the design of technical solutions to 
protect privacy in the smart grid [13]. Wagner et al. propose a 
privacy-aware framework for the smart grid based on 
semantic web technologies. Garcia and Jacobs design a 
multiparty computation to compute the sum of their 
consumption privately. The NIST privacy subgroup suggests 
anonymizing traces of readings, as proposed by Efthymiou et 
al., but also warns of the ease of reidentication. Molina et al. 
highlight the private information that current meters leak, and 
sketch a protocol that uses zero-knowledge proofs to achieve 
privacy in metering. Kumari et al. propose usage control 
mechanisms for data shared by smart meters connected to web 
based social networks.  
It is equally important to make the principle of privacy by- 
design mandatory, including principles of data minimization 
and data deletion when using privacy enhancing technologies. 
As it is currently almost impossible to ensure the full 
anonymisation of personal data and it is often possible to ’re-
identify' or 'deanonymise' individuals hidden in anonymised 
data with astonishing ease, only aggregated data should be 
used to the maximum possible extend. Considering significant 
privacy threats, we ask for privacy impact assessment to be 
conducted prior to the smart meter roll out. 
Usually in data retention, data that is anonymised is 
considered non-personal because the data subject can no 
longer be identified and thus is not affected by the data 
protection framework. However, it is almost impossible to 
ensure the full anonymisation of personal data and it is often 
possible to ‘re-identify’ or ‘deanonymise’ individuals hidden 
in anonymised data easily by using e.g. advanced algorithms 
or conjunction with other data sets. Therefore in some cases 
the means likely reasonably used for identification would 
allow for the identification of the data subject and in 
consequence would lead to the processing of personal data 
which are subject to data protection principles. 
In respect with the aggregation of personal data, it is not 
clear how many persons one needs to aggregate on to protect 
individual data. This is also very context- and data dependent. 
Some research indicates that the minimum number of users is 
around 7 to 8, but in many circumstances it will be more. In 
case a meter is ‘adjacent’ to a household (i.e. majority of 
situations) we cannot say that we have any kind of data 
aggregation. There are simply too few inhabitants in such a 
household. 
On the other hand, it is possible to have a smart meter that 
is able to ‘tell’ which exact device was used at a particular 
time. It is easy to build in and there is actually a lot of research 
in de-aggregating the readings. It is certainly easy to identify 
big devices like a washing machine, tea kettle, etc. But even if 
data is aggregated over devices, it is critical – you can tell 
when one comes home in the evening, even if one does not 
know whether the device one uses then is light, the tea-
cooker, or a computer. Hence, the concept of data aggregation 
is here obstructed. Moreover, technical standards and systems 
should be developed with a focus on upgradeability to 
safeguard end to- end security ensuring the overall intelligent 
metering system is future-proof and ready to cope with future 
challenges. 
Standardization of smart grids is neither straightforward 
due to the huge number of stakeholders, the necessary speed, 
the many international activities and the still changing 
solutions make it a difficult task. Specific for the data privacy 
aspects, the consumer groups are asking for clear regulation 
around frequency of meter reading and usage of data. It is 
stressed that only data necessary to perform Smart Grid tasks 
should be collected and utilised. At the same time, whilst 
acknowledging benefits, Smart Grid/Meters should be 
designed for privacy and security. 
Currently, there is no publically available reference 
architecture for Smart Grids with references to how privacy is 
designed into the core functionality, referring to all standards 
and principles for IT systems, business practices, and physical 
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designs and networked infrastructures. 
Furthermore like in any other ICT-based infrastructure, 
cyber security has to be deeply analyzed. A single point of 
failure or back-door in the grid management system may be 
exploited to cut electrical supply to a country, resulting in 
enormous economic losses and endangering the whole 
community. Also, SmartGrids based ICT will transfer a lot of 
sensitive data that can be exploited to breach privacy, 
consequently, research has to ensure that state-of-the-art data-
protection and data-privacy approaches are taken into account. 
To this end the communication systems and ICT should be 
upgraded to fast and diversified paths of data infrastructure. 
Apart from consumer information handling in respect with 
security, privacy and data Protection, handling of huge 
amounts of data, the research issue is also the analysis of 
central versus decentral management. 
Also Privacy Enhancing Technologies have to play 
significant role in the case of Smart Grids. While modern data 
mining technologies undermine classic protection, new 
advances in cryptographic techniques have become practical, 
and allow us to build systems that do not require the sharing 
of personal information. In a nutshell, it has become possible 
to compute almost arbitrary functions on encrypted data, i.e. 
the entity that handles the data never learns any input, only the 
result of the computation. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Privacy and data protection challenge is arising in the move 
from the electricity grid towards the Smart Grid being 
unprecedented in terms of scale and complexity. This weighs 
even heavier dealing with critical infrastructure, in some cases 
unclear goals, some players moving into domains they have 
little experience in, a potentially huge privacy impact and an 
in-vivo implementation. An entirely new and complex model 
of inter-relationships poses challenges for the application of 
data protection. The wide ranging nature of the issues 
presented by smart metering hinders to encompass an 
exhaustive list of privacy and security points. In this emerging 
area, it is fully expected that new data protection problems and 
solutions will evolve as more smart meters are installed. The 
massive rollout of smart meters is already happening, so there 
is urgency to manage the way that smart meters process 
personal data, and the issues of general concern which warrant 
serious consideration by all those involved in this area. 
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